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BOOK REVIEW
HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY. By Don
Herzog. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,
1989. Pp. xv, 247. $12.95.
Reviewed by Lisa C. Ikemoto"
Don Herzog uses "methodological pluralism" to explain the
origins and contents of consent theory.1 That is, Professor Herzog uses
political philosophy, social history, narrative techniques and whatever else
seems to work to account for the sixteenth and seventeenth century rise
of what he defines as "any political, moral, legal, or social theory that
casts society as a collection of free individuals and then seeks to explain
or justify outcomes by appealing to their voluntary actions, especially
choice and consent."2 This multi-pronged method works; it makes for a
rich and textured account of the rise of consent theory in Tudor and Stuart
England. Professor Herzog describes the shift from the view of society
as a pre-existing unified hierarchy to the view of society as an
arrangement arising from the voluntary consent of masterless men.
Professor Herzog poses consent theory as "a creative response,
a proposed solution, to strains created by arguments and social change."3
In Chapter 2, entitled "Masterless Men," Herzog illustrates this point very
well, and he makes it fun. He describes the arguments and social changes
as they occurred in day-to-day Tudor and Stuart life. Among other facets
of everyday life, Herzog addresses "Apparel and Identity." In a very
orderly hierarchical society, one's dress identifies one's specific social
rank.4 In a society where the organizing principle of status was losing
its force, however, an oatmeal maker could dare to assert himself by
* Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis. B.A. 1984,
U.C. Los Angeles; J.D. 1987, U.C. Davis, King Hall School of Law; LL.M. 1989,
Columbia University.
1. D. HERzoG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 19 (1989)
[hereinafter HAPPY SLAVES]; see also A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975);
M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987).
2. HAPPY SLAVES, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Id. at 24.
4. Id. at 52 ("Only some ranks could wear wool; only some velvet ... ; and on
and on.").
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refusing to take off his hat to bishops.5 Professor Herzog's examples
are not silly. He makes his point clearly. It was not just that the
mastered began to feel free enough to act out their disrespect, to assert
themselves as masterless men. There had always been masterless men in
English society, but in Tudor and Stuart England, there were new
masterless men. There seemed to be more of them, and the masters
began to perceive these "disorderly types not under the thumb of some
authority" as the primary threat to social order.6 The old frameworks,
describing society as a unified hierarchy, no longer made sense.
Consent theory, according to Herzog, was not caused by social
change but was presented as a more accurate description, a better map for
understanding and evaluating a changing social world than the unified
hierarchy concept. While he asserts that consent theory presented a
superior alternative to the unified hierarchy concept, Professor Herzog
does not give us a chance to agree with him that other alternatives were
less superior maps than consent theory. He does nothing else but mention
them - civic humanism, the ancient constitution, natural rights and God's
providence.7 We know, three hundred years later, that consent theory
has proved to be the long-lived, dominant description of the social world,
and Professor Herzog's assertion that consent theory has survived by
virtue of being the most apt description certainly seems plausible.
However, he leaves us wondering if consent theory didn't get its start due
to better press. Was consent theory really accepted as the best map of
human relations, or was it simply the biggest?
Once consent theory had been presented, it became not only
descriptive of social change, but prescriptive as well. "[O]ur social lives
are partly constituted by the beliefs we have about roles and obligations.
... So changing these maps can already be changing the social world."'
Those who sought to control the shape of their social world wrote their
own versions of consent theory with this prescriptive force in mind.
Herzog interprets Hobbes' Leviathan,9 and Locke's Letter concerning
Toleration,1" as prescriptions intended to address very particular social
and political situations.
5. Id. at 53.
6. id. at 45.
7. Id. at 35.
8. Id. at 24.
9. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: PARTS ONE AND Two (H.W. Schneider ed. 1958).
10. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETrER
CONCERNINo TOLERATION (J.W. Gough 3d ed. 1966).
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Professor Herzog reminds us that Leviathan was published in
1651, nine years after civil war erupted in England and two years after
King Charles I was put to death. England had become a world of
masterless men and Hobbes describes this world in terms of consent
theory. What Hobbes was prescribing, however, was not continuing
social change, but a return to social order. The most interesting part of
Herzog's interpretation comes next: Hobbes blamed the civil war on
bellicose nobles seeking glory and fanatical Puritans seeking to make
England a holy state. Hobbes realized that these were the people who
would ignore his arguments. He also realized the driving power of ideas
in politics. Hobbes' program, therefore, was to change the institutions
and the vocabulary in which the trouble making ideas were learned. He
took aim at universities and the language of disobedience. This, according
to Herzog, was "Hobbes's strategy for influencing politics."" That is,
Hobbes was not simply proposing governance by stable sovereignty in
Leviathan. Hobbes sought to change the basic elements used in forming
ideas, and more specifically, to subtract the elements used in forming the
concept of consent. 
12
Perhaps Professor Herzog applies his contextual analysis too well.
In doing so, he transforms Hobbes from a theorist whose claims about the
state of humankind reflect past centuries and bear relevance in, the
11. HAPPY SLAVES, supra note 1, at 97.
12. See T. HOBBES, supra note 9, at 253-54.
In the second place, I observe the
diseases of a commonwealth that proceed from
the poison of seditious doctrines, whereof one is
that every private man is judge of good and evil
actions ...
Another doctrine repugnant to civil
society is that whatsoever a man does against his
conscience is sin; and it depends on the
presumption of making himself judge of good
and evil. For a man's conscience and his
judgement is the same thing, and as the
judgement, so as the conscience may be
erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject
to no civil law sins in all he does against his
conscience because he has no other rule to follow
but his own reason, yet it is not so with him that
he lives in a commonwealth, because the law is
the public conscience by which he has already
undertaken to be guided.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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twentieth century to a shrewd and pragmatic politician, located in a
specific place and time. 3 He does so at the cost of diminishing Hobbes'
ideas to mere strategic responses. 14 This will offend fans of Hobbes-the-
philosopher. For example, Herzog argues that Hobbes' assertions about
egoism were simply techniques for making glory-seeking nobles look
foolish. 5 Professor Herzog expressly denies that Hobbes was making
any claim about elemental human motivation. By making only a
contextual analysis of Leviathan, Herzog overlooks the possibility that
Hobbes' pragmatic responses may be based on principles or
presuppositions formed outside the context of post-civil war England.
Locke fares better under contextual analysis. Professor Herzog
uses Locke's response to a particular problem as an example of how the
liberal concept of neutrality developed.' 6 During the Tudor and Stuart
periods, the distinction between law and politics arose. This, of course,
is a concept essential to liberalism. As an opponent of liberalism, Hobbes
asserted that law be interpreted in light of sovereign command. For the
problem of religious dissent, Hobbes advocated passive obedience to the
sovereign's choice of religious practices. Locke, in response to the same
problem, elaborated on the law/politics distinction as a means of achieving
religious toleration. 17 According to Herzog, Locke was describing an
ideal world, in which church and state were separate.'" Like Hobbes,
Locke was addressing an immediate politic concern. 9 But Herzog
asserts that unlike Hobbes' response to the English civil war, Locke's
pragmatic response to the problems caused by religious dissent can be
13. Schneider, Introduction to T. HOBBES, supra note 9, at VII (1958) ("In 1651,
when the work was first published, the religious parts were for immediate application
to the crisis in which Cromwell found himself.").
14. Cf. id. at VII-VIII ("To Hobbes himself, however, both parts, the general
theory and the religious application, were taken with utmost seriousness and both express
Hobbes' intense devotion to his country and to his faith.").
15. HAPPY SLAVES, supra note 1, at 82 ("First, Hobbes wields egoism as a strategy
for unmasking the pretenses of his political opponents. Second, he thinks of egoism as
a therapeutic alternative to other human motivations.").
16. Id. at 148-81.
17. Gough, Introduction to J. LOCKE, supra note 10, at xli (1958) ("The fact that
the civil magistrate may become a member of a church does not affect its status as a
voluntary society, or in any way add to its powers.").
18. HAPPY SLAVES, supra note 1, at 165.
19. See J. LOCKE, supra note 10, at 128 ("1 esteem it above all things necessary to
distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle
the just bounds that lie between the one and the other.").
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abstracted from the context of Tudor and Stuart England. "Locke's Letter
is best thought of as urging the merits of social differentiation." 10
"Social differentiation" is a term that comes from social theory.
Herzog uses social theory to elaborate on Locke's thesis in Letter
Concerning Toleration. The language of social differentiation describes
a society divided into separate spheres - family, workplace, school, etc.
On the individual level, this means that a person holds a variety of largely
separate roles - daughter, waitress, student, etc. On the institutional
level, this means that different institutions dominate different spheres.
Liberalism tells us that differentiation is desirable. "Leakage across
roles" and spheres must be resisted in order to maintain a real opportunity
for individual choice. 21 The state must refrain from using its influence
in the religious sphere. This preserves the religious sphere as an area in
which the individual may exercise her power to choose, and it eliminates
an area in which the state's integrity will be subject to challenge.'
Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration was written in response to
a specific context - the proliferation of religious views and practices in
seventeenth century England. Yet, unlike his treatment of Hobbes,
Professor Herzog credits Locke's work with meaning beyond the context
of the one dispute. 3 Herzog validates Locke's claims by accepting them
as capable of being generalized, outside the context of seventeenth century
religious dissent. Of course, Locke's claims are essential to liberalism.
And while Professor Herzog notes that liberalism differs from consent
theory, he rightly points out that they overlap, and that "[a] liberal world
20. HAPPY SLAVES, supra note 1, at 168.
21. Id. at 166.
22. But see Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Forward. Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5-17 (1986). Michelman describes Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), as an example of how the application of an abstractly
neutral rule may result in unjustifiable interference with personal freedom. In Goldman,
the Supreme Court voted 5-4 to reject the claim of Simcha Goldman, an Orthodox Jew
and ordained rabbi, that his commander's refusal to let Goldman wear a yarmulke while
on duty at the March Air Force Base hospital violated his first amendment right of
religious liberty. Michelman casts this decision as a "Coverian Parable," an example
of Robert Cover's assertion that law under liberal neutrality does not effect toleration but
provides "a resource in signification that enables us to submit, rejoice, struggle, pervert,
mock, disgrace, humiliate, or dignify." Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
23. HAPPY SLAVES, supra note 1, at 168 (concluding that "Locke's Letter is best
thought of as urging the merits of social differentiation, of opportunistically extending
a happy trend").
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
must be, in part, a world of consent theory . . . . "' So, he must accord
Locke credence as a philosopher. While his interpretation of Locke has
significant merit, Professor Herzog's contrasting treatment of Leviathan
suggests that he was a little strategic himself.
During his discourse on liberal neutrality, Herzog begins the final
task of Happy Slaves - addressing the question of whether consent theory
is relevant now. His answer is a resounding 'yes!' Consent theory
provides a "reliable map" to modern society as well as to the social
relations among masterless men and women in earlier times.' As a
map, Herzog reminds us, a political theory is both descriptive and
prescriptive. "Consent theory is our map to what our social relations look
like - and our guide to what they should look like."' That is, consent
theory provides an ideal with some transforming power.
In anointing consent theory as the most "admirable guide" to
modern society, Happy Slaves becomes less "A Critique of Consent
Theory" than a justification of consent theory. It is here that
methodological pluralism serves Herzog best. Because it requires him to
justify consent theory on several different levels, methodological pluralism
adds depth to Herzog's project. For those who find political philosophy
a little too heavy in hypotheses based on unrealistic assumptions, the use
of history and social theory may infuse Herzog's arguments with a
necessary sense of experiential-based analysis and therefore, credibility.
And, the interdisciplinary approach not only enriches our understanding
of Locke, liberalism and consent theory, but it also contributes to the
cause of scholarship. Herzog's work in Happy Slaves illustrates that
political philosophers, historians, social theorists, etc., need not work
isolated from each other. On the contrary, their authority may be
strengthened, as Herzog's is, when the disciplinary barriers are dropped.
Ironically, by using an interdisciplinary approach, Herzog equips
the reader with the tools to critique consent theory where Herzog would
justify it. He praises differentiation as the necessary means to achieving
individual freedom. He has us consider the values of freedom, autonomy
and individuality in terms of social theory. Thus, "an individual is free
when he faces a range of significant options." 2 These options arise not
from the individual, but from social and institutional arrangements. By
defining the values of the liberal state - freedom, autonomy and
24. Id. at 179.
25. Id. at 247.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 173.
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individuality - in the context of social theory, Herzog calls into question
the arrangements that would promote those values.
In liberal theory, an arrangement in which social and institutional
roles are highly differentiated will provide the range of significant options
necessary to free choice. Liberal neutrality requires the individual to "be
selectively forgetful in their different roles and attend only to
considerations that are contextually defined as relevant."' Thus, the
individual must categorize aspects of her life as relevant or irrelevant.
As a starting point, requiring a person to determine that aspects
of her life are irrelevant seems dehumanizing. Herzog does make it clear
that persons are subject to this requirement when they function as judge
or jury. The individual is being asked to avoid biases appurtenant to one
role while in another.' According to Herzog, therefore, differentiation
serves to maintain norms for appropriate role behavior.'
The reason suggested by Roberto Unger and other critical legal
scholars is that liberalism and consent theory, in effect, stifle our ability
to imagine alternative social arrangements in which the individual could
transcend these conflicts.31 Where differentiation is the organizing
principle for social relations, the individual and the society are
fragmented. Since an individual cannot experience a life in which she can
realize all aspects of herself at once, it becomes difficult to envision a set
of social relations that would accommodate the whole person. The act of
re-imagining society is further inhibited by the fact that the liberal state
exists to promote an orderly society; a society that changes little or not at
all. If the rearrangement of social relations never occurs, we become
reluctant to predict the success of a new set of social relations. We fear
28. Id. at 166.
29. For example, "Michael [a printer, a Democrat and a Greenpeace activist] should
not deliberately delay jobs already contracted for by industrialists or Republicans in the
print shop even if he finds them politically objectionable." Id.
30. This, however, begs the question. The only reason it seems inappropriate for
Michael to delay jobs contracted for by industrialists and Republicans is because we
accept the norm of neutrality. And, more importantly, it is because we accept a picture
of society that allows Michael to be either a printer or a political activist, but not both
at the same time. True, the neutrality principle appears to be based on acceptable values
- fairness and equality. But why can't we form a set of social relations that would not
fragment the individual? Why can we only imagine a society in which Michael is able
to avoid conflict with himself by ignoring aspects of his own identity?
31. See, e.g., 2 R. UNGER, POLITICS: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVESOCIAL THEORY;
FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL
DEMOCRACY 355-95 (1987); R. UNGER, PASSION, AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 39-89
(1984)..
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that implementing alternatives would prove infeasible, and so, we rarely
try.32
This does not mean, however, that change has become impossible.
Professor Herzog seems to believe that the power of our present set of
social relations to shape our identities paralyzes our ability to recreate
those relations.33 Ironically, he underestimates the building power of
human imagination. The irony arises from the content of Happy Slaves,
which documents an earlier transformation in social relations, fueled in
part by the prescriptive power of a product of human imagination -
consent theory. But consent theory, apparently, is the end-all and be-all.
Herzog admits that consent theory is not foolproof.
We often overlook the complications and retreat to facile
but misleading accounts . . . . [W]e pretend our social
roles and institutions are purely libertarian, that we
choose to enter them and choose within them. We use
consent theory not as a map.., but as a set of blinders
or rose-colored glasses that make the world look clearer,
less problematic, than it really is. 4
His solution seems to be an admonition to us to remember that consent
theory is a map and should not be used as rose-colored glasses. But
doesn't that beg the question, too? Doesn't consent theory prescribe a
simplistic, unproblematic picture of the world? Perhaps we need a
complex and troubling map to help us realize our complex and troubling
selves.
The use of differentiation to maintain neutrality as a normative
32. Recent attempts have varied in scope and acceptance. An example is a
community in Middle Florida that shelters itself from the busy world by living with the
earth. "More than just another hippie commune of the [19160's, Gentle World is a
throwback to the 19th-Century utopian societies of Brook Farm and the Oneida
Community." Schudel, The Gentle Folk. A Few Idealistic Refugees from the '60s Exert
a Quiet Pressure on the Rest of us to Respect the Earth, Ft. Lauderdale News/Sun-
Sentinel, June 18, 1989, SUNSHINE (The Magazine of South Florida), at 6. Other
examples include the Jonestown Tragedy and the various Hare Krishna groups. See
Delgado, When Religious Exercise is not Free: Deprogramming and the Constitutional
Status of Coercively Induced Belief, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1071 (1984); see also Laycock,
A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409 (1986).
33. Herzog, Rummaging Through the Emperor's Wardrobe (Book Review), 86
MICH. L. REV. 1434, 1442-43 (1988).
34. HAPPY SLAVES, supra note 1, at 247.
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force raises another point. As a normative force, differentiation seems to
repress individuality - one of the values supposedly promoted by
liberalism and consent theory. Herzog asserts that differentiation allows
room for individuality. One can escape an oppressive norm by occupying
another role.3" Escape, however, does not cure the problem. Some
roles cannot be ignored. And some norms pervade so many spheres of
life that changing roles will not provide escape. A person of color in our
society cannot escape the oppressive cultural norm of racism by becoming
white. Even if one could change color, this would not eliminate the
oppression. It might, in fact, perpetuate the problem.
Herzog's response might be found in Chapter 6 - Consent of the
Governed, where he discusses the problem of the permanent minority in
a democracy. The individual's obligation to the state is tied to the state's
responsiveness to the people. Therefore, if the government is less
responsive to certain minority groups, the state's authority is less
legitimate as to members of those groups and the individual members of
those groups have a weaker obligation to obey the law than those to whom
the government does respond. So, Herzog describes a very appealing
picture - "a state responsive to all the people, rich and poor, male and
female, white and black, and so on . . . ."' He also admits that this
view requires "sober skepticism," for "[t]he modern state is a juggernaut,
all too fond of embarking on decidedly ugly projects."37 Yet, according
to liberal theory, "it's better than the alternative, so we are justified in
embracing it. "38 This appears to deny the power of consent theory to
prescribe a means of achieving the ideal. As a map, then, does consent
theory only offer us a means of avoiding something worse?
In sum, Professor Herzog's account of liberalism and consent
theory is worth reading. His use of history and social theory to illuminate
political theory is well done and highly informative. He justifies consent
theory as far as it is possible to do so. So, for those reading with rose-
colored glasses, Happy Slaves will prove very satisfying. For those
concerned about the fragmented individual and political minorities in our
society, Happy Slaves will stimulate further concern and perhaps, fruitful
critique.
35. If Michael botches a job at work, "his mistake will not relentlessly follow and
shame him wherever he goes. He can spend more time at party headquarters, where
people probably neither know nor care about his performance on the job." Id. at 174.
36. Id. at 213.
37. Id. at 214.
38. Id.
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